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COMMENTS ON THE TENSION BETWEEN TRADE AND
ANTITRUST LAWS
MODERATOR: JIMMIE V. REYNA*
PANEL MEMBERS: HARVEY M. APPLEBAUM,**
GABRIEL CASTANEDA GALLARDO,***
ELEANOR M. FOX,****
JOHN GERO,*****
TERENCE P. STEWART,******
MICHAEL W. GORDON.*******
Jimmie V. Reyna: Articles on tensions between the conceptions and
practical applications of laws regulating international trade and antitrust
or competition laws have been addressed by the members of this panel
on pages in the preceding articles in this volume of the United States-
Mexico Law Journal. We have invited each of them to comment on the
contributions of the other members of the panel.
Harvey M. Applebaum: Terry Stewart mentioned the obvious fact that
one way that one can avoid a dumping charge, if you are caught dumping
or charged with dumping and your price in the foreign market is higher
than in the United States or Canada, is not by raising the price in the
United States, Canada or Mexico, but by lowering the price in the home
market. We both know there's a limitation on how far you can go in
doing that. Many antidumping proponents and many companies and
industries that bring antidumping cases and prevail are shocked and
outraged when they see the prices go down in the home market rather
than go up in the United States. He's absolutely right about that. It is
an option that a foreign producer often has to avoid dumping by lowering
the home market price. That option is not 100% available. To me that
by and large communicates the problem with the statute. I'm not talking
about competition versus antidumping. Let me note this: I have brought
antidumping petitions for Motorola, AT&T and other companies. I'm
like the Canadians - as long as the law is on the books, we'll use it.
But this is not a law that makes any sense in the real world for the
most part. Japanese, British, French, Canadian, American companies
don't sit around if they're bored at directors' meetings and say we've
got this surplus over here in our country; let's dump excess merchandise
elsewhere. The markets usually are not intertwined. The reason that prices
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are higher in other countries compared to the United States often has
nothing to do with cross- subsidies, the notion that we've got higher
profits in the home market, therefore, we can sell at lower prices in the
United States or wherever, or we're doing real well in product A, let's
use those profits to subsidize low-priced sales of product B in the United
States. My problem with the antidumping law is that it makes no economic
sense. I think the fact that you can eliminate dumping in many cases
by lowering the home market price rather than raising the United States
price is a good indication of that.
Terry Stewart also raised the interesting question whether, assuming
some of the proposals in the ABA Task Force Report were implemented,
would that violate the GATT? The GATT does have a Code, which the
United States has signed which prescribes how the antidumping law is
to be operated. The GATT is intended to have minimum requirements
in order to implement the antidumping law. If the United States, Canada
and Mexico were to make it more restrictive or increase the severity of
the standards and therefore make it more difficult to obtain relief under
the NAFTA country trade remedy laws, I don't believe that would be
considered a violation of the GATT.
John Gero gave three examples of how you can inadvertently wander
into being exposed to dumping. The most common is the first one, which
is uniform delivered prices inside the border of Canada, the United States
or Mexico. Although it would not be a competition law problem, it could
be an antidumping law problem. I think the normal answer to that is
that there is a material injury requirement. It's a lot less than the antitrust
law injury requirements. Nonetheless, many companies and industries do
not file antidumping petitions even when they know there's dumping
because of the material injury requirement. There's dumping either because
the prices in the home market are clearly below cost or because of
uniform delivered pricing policies or because the foreign companies are
meeting competition in the United States which makes their price here
lower than in the home market. But there is the material injury require-
ment. The companies can't show material injury even under the laws as
they exist.
Finally, if the U.S. government adopted either of the approaches
suggested by the ABA Task Force Report to replace antidumping law
with competition laws, or to make the antidumping laws somewhat more
akin to the antitrust laws, either of those approaches would make it
much more difficult to prosecute an antidumping case. That is why I
have said that NAFTA is the most attractive area in which to consider
doing that; NAFTA is based on the concept of a free trade area, and
the elimination of all barriers to trade.
Terry Stewart's comments were ingenious in suggesting that the debate
is upside down and we ought to put the antidumping law principles into
the antitrust laws, but I would like to hear whether he makes any exception
for antidumping competition law in the context of the NAFTA.
Gabriel Castafieda Gallardo: I have four comments.
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First, if the rule of the game is free trade, antidumping as we know
it is really a barrier to entry. People have to think about it before
entering a market. It's costly and, as a result, the market is not working
properly. The analytical tools of antitrust are more objective; they make
economic sense. There are gaps in antidumping theory that are not well
explained in the economic sense or in a practical way.
Second, I think if we look at dumping the way it is, it strikes me
that it looks just the other way around from competi tion. Someone
who wants to enter a market is being challenged by someone or several
people, who don't want that specific entrant into the market. Competition
is the other way around. How do we guarantee people coming into the
market? Market entry is a major thing in competition. In dumping it's
the other way around; it's how we try to get people to not get into a
specific market. In this case, Mexico, Canada and the U.S. could try to
take this great opportunity, not to scrap the whole system altogether,
but to change some of the analytical tools and see what happens. As I
said in my previous presentation, there wouldn't be much harm to the
U.S. interests and there certainly wouldn't be much harm to Canadian
interests.
Third, I think the antidumping laws encourage collusive activity among
companies. From my experience in antitrust I think it is a great problem.
That is why the Mexican Competition Commission in its time looked at
the antidumping cases closely and sometimes we found enough antitrust
evidence to investigate.
Fourth, I think we certainly need higher standards for antidumping to
make it more transparent and more economically valid. I think material
injury tests have to be properly discussed and properly and transparently
decided within enforcement agencies. It isn't clear to me what uniform
rules exist in the U.S. and Mexico and whether those uniform rules are
properly enforced. I think that's a major concern about the interaction
of competition and antidumping mechanisms.
Now let's be honest about it. I don't think that antidumping laws will
soon disappear. I think the main reason is that predatory pricing, which
is the counterpart of antidumping under antitrust theory, is very hard
to prove. So I'm sure government officials and politicians will argue that
it's just not possible to substitute predatory pricing legislation for an-
tidumping legisla tion as a trade remedy. Therefore, I think we must
convince the protectionist side of the political decision making process
that some high standards will have to be embedded into the antidumping
laws.
Eleanor M. Fox: I have a few comments. Of course, I fully agree
with Harvey Applebaum, Gabriel Castafieda and John Gero.
First of all, it seems to me true that antidumping laws are exclusionary
restraints. Therefore, they should be subject to a really high degree of
justification.
Second, the issue of antidumping versus antitrust is a national issue;
not just an international issue. If the case against antidumping laws is
correct, then each nation should look at the law and say for itself, "We
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are shooting ourselves in the foot! We do not want to keep out the low-
priced competition. We want price competition." However, because of
the political landscape, we seem unable to deal with the problem on our
own turf without regard to what other nations do. One reason why we
have been unable to deal with the problem on a national basis is: people
hurt here and now by low price competition are ready to testify, lobby
and pay, whereas the people who will be benefitted by competition and
low prices are scattered and unidentified. Competition helps people and
businesses in the longer run. But it is very hard to get that group together
to lobby their representatives in Congress effectively.
Political support for reform might come from the intermediary buyers
injured by the antidumping laws. There are always injured intermediary
buyers of imports who want to get lowest price execution and compete
in the international markets; these businesses may be hurt here and now
by the antidumping laws. Apple Computer Company wanted lower priced
chips in order to compete in world markets. Supporters of reform may
find political allies among the community of intermediate buyers who
engage in world competition.
Mr. Stewart made a couple of very interesting points. I agree with
some, maybe even a lot, of his underlying sentiment.
However, with one point, I disagree. Mr. Stewart said that both the
antidumping laws and the antitrust laws are designed to get a rational
allocation of resources. But the question for a rational allocation of
resources is distorted on the trade law side by the lobbying for protection
of domestic business interests and whose oxen are being gored at the
moment.
Mr. Stewart said that the antitrust laws should learn from the trade
laws. He suggested that many competitors are faced with unfair com-
petition and if they weren't faced with this unfair competition they would
stay in business or they would newly enter business and they would do
well; that it is the unfair competition, not their inefficiencies, that is
hurting them. This was once the point of view accepted by U. S. antitrust
law. We had a case called Utah Pie' which said that if a company is
hurt by unfair competition, in the form of strategic low-price competition,
it ought to have a remedy. Utah Pie was our law for a long number
of years. We came to understand that this principle was protectionist.
It coddled inefficiencies and inefficient firms, no matter how much one
might say it merely prohibited unfairness. U.S. courts finally confronted
the problem. Modern decisions recognize that price competition is at the
heart of competition, and any principle of law that will stop people in
their tracks from competing by charging sustainably low prices is perverse
to the whole competition enterprise.
I agree with a number of specific things that Mr. Stewart said, including
his reference to the Brooke Group case. 2 Brown and Williamson charged
1. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
2. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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a price below average variable cost for eighteen months. I agree with
Mr. Stewart and not the Court that there was recoupment, concurrent
recoupement. There was a low price that was actually below cost and
actually there was recoupment, concurrent recoupment. Our Supreme
Court has formulated some overly permissive rules in antitrust, as it did
in Brooke Group and as it did in the Matsushita3 case. But while I think
that both decisions suffer from serious flaws, their outcome may be
right. In any case, I do believe that low pricing is so important to
competition that we should have a prophylactic rule to protect it.
John Gero: Let me talk about a few points that have been raised in
the conversation. One is the question of violation of World Trade Or-
ganization into agreements. There isn't any violation. Yes, you aren't
allowed to have different regimes for different countries under the WTO.
However, WTO does make provision for free trade areas which allow
you to override the so-called most favored nation treatment. Therefore,
having an inter-NAFTA arrangement is fully consistent with all three of
our international obligations.
Two, the question of the double test, the requirement to prove both
dumping and material injury. However, in any economic downturn,
(particularly because U.S. laws are a little more lenient on causality than
the Mexican or Canadian laws) an injury finding is almost automatic.
That's why most dumping cases are brought in economic downturns
rather than when things are good.
Three, I think it's worthwhile concentrating on the politics of this. I
think Mr. Castafieda is right, the political situations in all three of our
countries are such that it would be very difficult to make significant
changes in the antidumping laws. Therefore, we need to look at the
possibilities creatively and innovatively. I'm going to make all the lawyers
and some of the antitrust people reading this feel a little uncomfortable.
It seems to me the real crux of the question of whether you use antid-
umping laws within North America or not is how comfortable U.S.
businesses are as to whether "their opposite numbers" in Mexico and
Canada are really operating under the same business principles and the
same business practices as they are doing in the States. To achieve that,
do you really need litigation, or is there an alternative? In a number of
fields in legal practice today, some kind of alternative dispute resolution
is being considered in North America. Could commercial arbitration
provide an alternative to the use of trade remedy laws? Is a possible
solution to our problems in North America convincing North American
industries that, in the context of North America, one shouldn't necessarily
use antidumping laws, one should try to mediate rather than litigate?
Of course in the context of competitors using mediation, this may make
our antitrust colleagues feel somewhat concerned. Although I've been
told this isn't true, my guess is that the minute antitrust authorities see
two businessmen having lunch together, they will immediately think that
3. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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there is some collusion going on. Therefore if one heads toward some
kind of mediation process, there is some concern that what they are
really doing is setting up a North American cartel. I think there are
innovative ways of getting around that without doing injury to our
antitrust laws. These are the kinds of things we will need to focus on.
Because the bottom line in all of this is that unless you make the folks
that use antidumping comfortable that they are not being damaged by
the practices of other companies within North America, the political
realities are that in none of our countries are we going to be able to
make major steps forward and achieve substantial changes.
Finally, I think it's worthwhile looking at the question of international
progress in this regard. Governments have used interlinkages between
trade and competition policies in the past to, in essence, balance out
domestic political pressures. So therefore the fact that these issues are
being discussed in an international context benefits all of us.
Terence P. Stewart: Let me take the issues in somewhat the order they
were raised. Harvey Applebaum asked me whether my comments would
be different vis-a-vis NAFTA than for the world at large. The answer
would be no. First, there is a misconception that the general practice in
free trade areas is to abandon trade remedies. That's not only not true
in the United States but it's not true in the Mercasur. It's not true for
the European Union or the former EFTA countries, all of whom have
maintained dumping laws vis-a-vis Central and Eastern Europe even
though they have association agreements with these countries which are
proxies for free trade agreements. They have done this because both
sides have concerns about significant differences between their economies
and the need to have some internationally recognized mechanism for
dealing with that. So, in my view, there is not a reason to distinguish
NAFTA from the other associations.
With regard to WTO obligations, it is certainly true that if one were
to eliminate globally the trade laws of any particular country, there would
not be a WTO issue. You are not obligated to have a dumping law or
a countervailing duty law or a safeguard law. The issue is far less clear,
despite what my distinguished friend from Canada had to say, if you
have different standards for different countries. There have been several
challenges under Article 19 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
that were scuttled before there was ever a panel decision, exactly because
countries within an FTA are not subject to the requirements of the
safeguard action. And I think that similar arguments could certainly be
made if you had higher standards in dumping actions within NAFTA
than you had elsewhere. It is at least not a foregone conclusion that
you have a GATT consistency under Article 24 and there have been
complaints within the old GATT system under Article 19.
The comment that the dumping law makes no economic sense seemed
to flow from the fact that, if businessmen are not con sciously cross-
subsidizing; there ought not to be actionability. This objection results
from looking for evil action or wrongful conduct by the actors versus
misallocation of resources within the system. The reality is, whether or
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not companies consciously intend to cross-subsidize (and I suggest that
it is not uncommon that that may happen but I will certainly accept
that it is not always the rule), the reality is that if you are unable to
cross- subsidize yourself you will be driven out of business or sent the
false market signal that clearly exists.
Professor Fox's comment about past practice in the United States seems
to me to be contradictory. On the one hand she said that price competition
is a good per se but then said it was a question about whether the prices
were sustainable low prices. One has to look at whether one is talking
about sustainable on its own merits, i.e., that you have rational allocation
of resources. But I have been involved in many cases where companies
which, at the start of the process had the best cost structure, were out
of business by the time the process was over simply because they had
no other pocket to dig into. If you look at the problems that the
supercomputer industry is facing in the United States today, they are in
large part due to a decline in defense demand, and also to the fact that
all of our supercomputer companies are single product companies. The
people they compete with internationally are horizontally broad electronic
and computer companies. At the end of the day, if you are selling below
cost or selling below the cost of your capital, you are going out of
business. That is what has happened to virtually all of our supercomputer
companies. That's what happened to our semiconductor companies back
in the 70's. So, I think it is the concept of intent (which permeates the
comments of Mr. Applebaum and seems to be the essence of
Professor Fox's concern) that is wrong with the analysis that antitrust
people bring to trade policy. They say if there is no intent, if there is
no wrongful conduct by an actor, then it ought not to be action able.
That ignores whether or not the underlying conduct results in a misal-
location of resources. I understand that the University of Chicago School
of Economics is certainly of the opinion that the only test, the only
economic justification, for conduct at the end of the day is whether it
promotes economic rationality. In my opinion, antitrust law as it is
presently construed does not do that, at least in this one area.
Michael W. Gordon: This is for Mr. Stewart: It seems a little unusual
that competitors in Vancouver and Seattle would have dumping actions
as a possible remedy and the company in Seattle would not have that
same remedy against a Miami enterprise. Vancouver would, of course
have that against Miami but Seattle would not. Maybe there is an equal
protection argument but we should leave that out. Since you are not
willing to take Mr. Applebaum's suggestion that NAFTA ought to be
treated differently, would you say that were Mexico not in NAFTA,
NAFTA ought to be treated differently. In other words because of the
greater similarities between U.S. and Canada do you think we would
have been more likely to get rid of dumping had we not extended approval
of free trade arrangements beyond the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment?
Stewart: The gist of this question is whether there should be the same
remedy between Seattle and Miami as between Seattle and Vancouver.
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I think it is not up to trade law to provide that; it is up to competition
law to provide it.
Gordon: Is there any place in between the competition law and the
trade law where you would suggest we make modifications to the dumping
rules in the NAFTA context, for example, by increasing substantially de
minimis limits on less than fair value determina tions, by increasing the
causal relation test, perhaps by eliminat ing the mom and pop dumping
cases: the woodwind reed case of the Italian company that comes to the
United States having failed in Italy in competition there and then uses
the dumping law in the United States to go after competition from the
Italian reeds; the rose cases between Columbian and other rosegrowers.
We seem to have placed enormous costs on smaller businesses. Should
we look at dumping differently for the steel industry than the woodwind
reed industry? Would there also be some way that might be tied into
that to allocate cost differently rather than have this great burden which
is often imposed on small foreign companies to pay their costs while the
costs of the United States in bringing a petition is essentially a taxpayer-
driven cost. Are there some fine tunings or some alterations that could
be done in the NAFTA in a kind of experimental arena that at a later
time could apply to dumping throughout the world?
Stewart: With regard to the assumption that somehow there need to
be higher standards, the statistics out of the International Trade Com-
mission indicate that in the last 15 years, over 60016 of the cases filed
have resulted in negative injury determinations either at the preliminary
or at the final hearing. So if you were to ask domestic petitioners whether
the standard is too high or too low, they probably would view them as
too high.
With regard to taxpayers picking up the cost of petitions being brought,
I certainly have clients who would love that if that were true. But it is
every bit as expensive for U.S. companies to bring cases as it is for
foreign companies to defend them. That is not true in Europe where
there is a relatively low cost process for industries to prosecute cases
because they do not enforce a lot of due process requirements. The
United States does require due process and there are heavy standards in
terms of the type of information that must be submitted, therefore it is
an expensive proposition to bring a case in the United States.
With regard to types of cases, I won't comment on the woodwind
case because I wasn't involved with it. Since we brought the roses case,
we have a slightly different view of the market situation, particularly
since over the last 15 years more than 80% of the flower growers in
the United States, who were all mom and pop businesses, have been
driven out of business. If there is one thing that could be experimented
with in NAFTA, it is taking politics out of the cases. I would suggest
to you that the outcome in the roses case was driven by politics and
the politics wasn't that of the domestic industry.
There are, in my view, a lot of overly simplistic views about the trade
laws and, with deference to all of you who are competition buffs and
competition practitioners, if you start from the analysis that competition
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policy is a per se good, and trade policy is a per se evil, you will, of
course, come to the conclusions that keep being printed and keep coming
back at me.
The problems with regard to allocation of resources are real. Many
U.S. industries, Mexican industries, Canadian industries, go out of ex-
istence not because they weren't providing a highly competitive product
at a competitive price, but because they did not have the ability to cross-
subsidize. Steel is a particular sore spot globally. It is a particular sore
spot globally, in my view, because there is no multi-lateral mechanism
to deal with what has been long-term government supported structural
excess capacity. That leaves critical industries like steel to fight it out
periodically when the economy goes down. Canada, the European Union,
Brazil, and many other countries have, for various policy reasons, sup-
ported very large steel industries that were not sustainable in and of
themselves.
In terms of the prevalence of cases, there is a low incidence of dumping
cases in the NAFTA area under the trade rules. The big disputes with
Canada tend to be countervailing duty if you take steel out of the picture.
The vast majority of the dollars that are caught up in cases involve
countervailing duty claims. That's a question of government harmonization
of policies in the subsidy area. It has nothing to do with the dumping
law.
In the case of Mexico, that Mexico could conceive of giving up the
trade laws suggests that they have a very poor understanding of where
their own national interests lie. At the end of the day, we are all nation
states. Although the European Union may have moved to a superstate
and their nations may have agreed to give up lots of things, at the end
of the day the legislators and administrators of those nations are supposed
to be doing things for the welfare of the citizens of their countries. It
is not the job of the U.S. Congress, nor I would say of the U.S.
Commerce Department, to look out for the economic welfare of the
Mexican citizen or the Canadian citizen. Rational resource allocation
should be supported by both. At the moment the assumption of the
antitrust lobby is that theirs is the only holy grail and that if you deviate
from where antitrust is you are not dealing with what is good for economic
rationality. I don't agree.
Applebaum: Let me say that I agree with two of the points made.
One is that antidumping petitions are extremely expensive and the costs
are growing all the time. The Uruguay Round amendments make the
cases more complicated. I think it is fair to say that an original case
going through the ITC and the Commerce Department is going to cost
a U.S. petitioner or industry at least a million dollars. If you win the
case, it's not over. Judicial review is automatic now in these cases, with
two levels. And if you are interested in maintaining the antidumping
order, you do this yearly. Mr. Stewart mentioned the bearings case order,
which I believe is six or seven years old now, and the U.S. industry
continues to prosecute them. Part of the reason for the expense is that
the material injury requirement, low though it may be, is real. Many
19961
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cases aren't brought because the lawyers persuade U.S. prospective pe-
titioners that they don't have a good injury case. Second, the question
about whether 60% of the cases have resulted in negative injury deter-
minations depends in part on how you view multi-country cases. But it's
not an automatic. There are ITC preliminary injury determinations, and
I'll give you two examples. The Big Three automobile manufacturers lost
their mini-van antidumping case at the ITC final injury determination,
and you may have read that when the big avalanche of steel cases came
down about two years ago, the U.S. industry took a major hit in losses
in a number of those cases. In fact many of the U.S. steel companies
believed that overall they had lost. So determinations on the existence
of material injury are not automatic.
